Standing Committee F

[Mr George Stevenson in the Chair]

Hunting Bill

Clause 45 - Interpretation

James Gray: I beg to move amendment No. 361, in
clause 45, page 18, leave out line 16.
 During an exchange with the Minister before the Committee, I was trying to think of an analogy for this situation. Should I say, ''Once more into the breach, dear friends'', or comment that we are coming to the end of the hunting day but there is still plenty of life left in the hounds and we will kill a few foxes before the end of it? I cannot really think of a good analogy, however. 
 I am glad that I shall not have to be here on Tuesdays and Thursdays at five to nine from now on, although quite what I shall do with my time—[Hon. Members: ''Hunt.''] That is a good idea. I shall fix up as many hunting appointments as I can before this mob on the Labour Benches prevents me from doing so. I am quite looking forward to being relieved of all this, I must say. 
 Under clause 45(3), any person who owns an interest in, manages, controls or occupies land may be taken to be a person to whom the land belongs and thus potentially a criminal under clause 4. Frequently there are many so-called interests in land. As a technical term in law, that includes a right of way across property. It is ridiculous to criminalise parties with interests in land, such as those with a right of way, who have no control over the premises. Therefore, it is important to amend clause 45(3). 
 Any liability should be restricted to the occupiers, whom case law has defined as those who have sufficient control of the premises to make them liable. The definition of someone to whom land belongs is so widely drawn here as to capture those with only a nominal, indirect or transient interest and involvement in the land, which is clearly unfair. A person with a minority interest in the land in question might strongly object to its use for hunting but be unable to prevent it. The Minister has told us that that has often been the case with illegal hare coursing. People do not want land to be used for that, but have often had no option but to allow the thugs and criminals to carry on doing it. It is unfair that even though such people are, technically speaking, the landowners, they should become criminally liable for something that other people are doing. 
 An owner of land might be neither its occupier nor its controller in practice. He might own the freehold, but the land might be tenanted or leased to a third party. The owner might be hundreds of miles away 
 when the offence is committed or alleged to have been committed. To prosecute that individual would be absurd, because they might know nothing abut the activity. 
 The real problem stems from the criminal offences created in clause 4, which, in effect, make the landowner responsible for policing the enforcement of the legislation. When prosecuted, they will have to prove that they have not knowingly permitted land belonging to them to be used for hunting. That reverses the burden of proof. It should be for the prosecution to prove that knowing permission was given, not vice versa. In any case, it is not at all clear what one has to know, in order to commit the offences. Will a dog owner who knowingly permits his dog to be used for flushing out be caught if an offence is inadvertently committed? Will a landowner who thinks that people are using his land for lawful activities be guilty if an offence is then committed? If the landowner thinks that those people are perfectly legitimate but they inadvertently commit a crime, is he guilty? For example, a game shoot might inadvertently put up a hare, which is then shot by the guns. The landowner who allowed his land to be used would not have wanted any crime to be committed, but unless the dogs used were registered, the flushing of the game to the guns would be an inadvertent crime, committed not only by the person who shot the hare but by the landowner who allowed the shoot to occur on his land.

Gregory Barker: I am loth to interrupt, but I should like to expand on the point about dogs. If several dog owners participate in a shoot, but each believes that their dog is one of two being used for flushing out, there could be three dogs being used for that purpose. The third dog would be unknown to the other two owners, but all three would be committing a criminal offence.

James Gray: That is, of course, the case. It is not directly pertinent to the amendment, but there is a link. It could be that even if the landowner on whose land such an offence occurred did not know that that was happening, he would be guilty because he allowed his land to be used for it. We come back, indirectly, to the question of intent. Did the landowner intend to allow the hunt, or the criminal, to carry out the offence on his land? Plainly, if he did, that might be an offence, but there might be many circumstances in which it could be proved that the landowner did not know that the offence was being committed and did not want it to happen.
 Our amendment, which leaves out line 16, would make the matter much clearer. The Bill would read: 
''For the purposes of this Act land belongs to a person''
 if he 
''manages or controls it''
 or 
''occupies it.''
 That is straightforward. The amendment would delete the words 
''owns an interest in it''.
 The person who owns an interest in the land may well have nothing whatever to do with the crime committed 
 on it. We hope that the Government will see the logic in the amendment and agree to it.

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman rightly says that the amendment would narrow the definition by removing the point about the person who ''owns an interest'' in the land. Narrowing the scope of the definition of when land belongs to a person would weaken the Bill. Let us take the example of clause 4 and the offence of knowingly permitting land to be used for hunting. If a person who owns an interest in that land commits that offence, why should they not be found guilty?
 Perhaps the reason why the hon. Gentleman fears some unfairness is based on a misunderstanding. The points that he made in his introduction sounded reasonable and sensible. It is recognised that the land ownership and management and control of land are not always straightforward. For example, there is land owned by colleges or land involving shared and multiple ownership. Since I took up office, I have been dealing with a number of issues relating to common land and that has certainly brought home to me the complexities of land ownership. 
 The important point is that, for an offence to be committed by an individual, it is necessary for him or her knowingly to have given permission for hunting to take place. That is crucial to an offence being committed and therefore a conviction being obtained. That provides the necessary protection against any danger of unfairness, which is clearly at the heart of the comments made by the hon. Gentleman when introducing the amendment. 
 The trouble with deleting the mention of individuals who own ''an interest in'' the land is that that interest might well result them in acting in such a way that an offence is committed. They would be the responsible individuals. Surely it would be wrong to delete the provision relating to such people. As I indicated, for an offence to be committed, it is necessary for an individual knowingly to have given permission for hunting to take place, which provides the necessary protection.

James Gray: The fact that, under clause 4, that has to be done knowingly is some safeguard. None the less, clause 4 reads:
''A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits land which belongs to him to be entered or used in the course of the commission of an offence''.
 Note that it does not state, ''for the purpose of committing the offence.'' That is quite plain. In other words, the landowner may not know what people intend to do, but in the course of doing the thing that is wrong, the landowner may well be guilty.

Alun Michael: I think I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. In other words, if a landowner were to allow somebody on to their land and thought that they were just going to park a car, without knowing that an offence was going to be committed, would that landowner then be caught? No, he would not. I understand the hon. Gentleman's fear now that
 he has explained it. The landowner would not be guilty of an offence in that event because he must have knowingly given permission for hunting to take place in order to have committed an offence.

Andrew George: I was not going to make a speech, although the matter is important. I share the hon. Gentleman's concern about the clause, but it might be better if the definition were wider. Taking the example of common land, does the Minister accept that there could be a problem if those who own an interest in the common land and give permission do not consult others who own an interest in the land? In such cases, all with an interest in the common land would be caught in the curtilage of committing an offence, although they did not knowingly give permission.

Alun Michael: I understand the hon. Gentleman's point, but the reverse is true. If there are a number of owners of a piece of land, and one of them were to give permission for people to come on to the land knowingly for hunting to take place, that individual would be guilty of the offence and the others would not. The others would have to knowingly share in that giving of permission, in order to share in the commission of the offence.

Andrew George: That answer is helpful but, as written in the Bill, all of those who own an interest in the land would be caught in the curtilage of the offence. There is no other provision referring only to those who own an interest in the land and give permission. It would be helpful if the Minister said whether he believes that further clarification is required in the Bill.

Alun Michael: I assure the hon. Gentleman that it is not. There is no lacuna in that case. In order to commit the offence or share in the committing of the offence, the individual would have to give permission knowingly for the hunting to take place. That person would have to share knowingly in the decision that led to the offence. Someone who shares ownership of land and does not have 100 per cent. ownership—for example, someone with, a 20 per cent. share—and who knowingly gives permission for the land to be used commits an offence. That is absolutely clear. Those who own the other 80 per cent. of the land, but do not knowingly give permission are not associated with the offence. The constituent elements of the offence are clear. They have to be in place for an individual to be guilty of that offence. That is clear without needing to repeat it in the Bill.

James Gray: I am still rather troubled by the matter. I accept the point that the Minister makes about collective ownership. That seems a reasonably sensible point, but the way in which clause 45 relates to clause 4 seems worrying. Clause 4(1) does not say that a person commits an offence if he allows hunting to occur or allows his land to be used for hunting. Clause 4(1) merely refers to land being entered or used in the course of a commission, not for the purpose of a commission. The phrase ''course of a commission'' is very important. If people stated that they were going on to land for other purposes, the collective owners would believe that those people were doing so legitimately and would not realise that there was an
 intent to commit the crime, but the crime may still be carried out. That is very worrying.

Alun Michael: No, the hon. Gentleman again misunderstands. I understand why he is worrying, and I hope that I can satisfy him on the point. Let me go back to the example of individuals asking for permission to park. Let us imagine that they ask an individual, ''Can we park our vehicles here? We are going for a walk on the hills.'' There is no suggestion that there is any knowledge of an intention to commit an offence. In that event, the person who shares in the ownership of the land, or a landowner, would not be committing an offence. If the person were to ask permission to go on to land with dogs in a trailer to undertake hare coursing, and the purpose for which that request was being undertaken was clear, the person would be knowingly committing the offence indicated here.
 In areas concerning legal interpretation, it is as well to take formal advice from lawyers. I am happy to write to members of the Committee to put the advice on that point on the record because I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman would like to hear a legally sound interpretation. However, I am confident that my interpretation is correct.

Edward Garnier: I understand the points that the Minister is making in response to the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray). Will he address corporate ownership of a piece of land by a limited company, a trust or some other form of legal, non-human instrument? Because such a body is just a set of bits of paper, it cannot think or act by itself, and can do so only through human beings. I can understand a situation in which the land agent gave permission for hunting to take place on the land, because we can clearly see from the Bill that the land agent, as a human being, will be liable. I dare say that the corporation will be liable because of the act of its servant. Where a number of servants—some of whom know about the illegal permission and some of whom do not—act for a company, however, one is left with the vicarious liability for a criminal offence committed by a company. The law on that matter has been fluid for a little while, and whereas in some respects a company can be vicariously liable for the offences of its servants and agents, in others it cannot. I wonder into which category hunting and the use of land for hunting will fall.

Alun Michael: The hon. and learned Gentleman always raises interesting questions, and I hope that I can give him a sensible answer. A corporation is, of course, legally a person in terms of the responsibilities for the use of land. Clause 44 covers offences by companies in the same way as the ownership of land by a body other than a company. In order for a prosecution to succeed, it would be necessary to show that an officer of the company consented or connived in the commission of the offence. The knowledge would have to be proved in relation to a company, or a person acting on behalf of a company, in the same way as it would in relation to an individual.That is the sort of area in which it would be sensible for me to provide legal advice to members of the Committee for the sake
 of clarification. The Bill will not change the situation in relation to a company. There are, of course, a variety of situations in which the liability of a company depends on demonstrating that an individual was knowingly acting on behalf of a company. The normal requirements in relation to the actions of a company or its representatives would apply here in the same way as they apply across the generality of the law.

Lembit Öpik: My ongoing concern is duress, which we have discussed at length. I hope that the Minister can assure me that there will be some guidance on how proactive somebody in that category would need to be in order to prevent their being prosecuted. I raise that point because there will be a policing issue; at the beginning, at least, there will be a lot uncertainty among people in that category.

Alun Michael: The amendment relates narrowly to people who own a share in the land and does not take us into more widely into the clause. However, the points that I made about duress in a previous debate apply equally to this clause. That may be the response that the hon. Gentleman is looking for.
 The hon. Member for North Wiltshire has raised a number of concerns, but members of the Committee can be assured that to include people with a share in land ensures that responsibility is correctly identified. It certainly would not enable a person to be prosecuted who had not committed the offence. That is at the heart of the issue. It would be odd to exclude someone with a share in the land, as they might commit the offence. For that reason, I am not willing to accept the amendment. 
 An inadvertent effect of the amendment would be to remove the power of an owner of an interest in unoccupied land to give permission for registered or exempt hunting to take place. I am sure that that is not the hon. Gentleman's intention. At present, such permission can be given by the occupier, where the land is occupied, or by the owner or manager where the land is unoccupied. I refer the hon. Gentleman to clauses 27(2)(c) and 28(2)(c). The amendment could prevent hunting on some unoccupied land. 
 I hope that I have said enough to satisfy the hon. Gentleman, but I also undertake to write to him and to copy the letter to other members of the Committee, to make explicit the legal advice on the points that he has raised.

Andrew George: I was interested in what the hon. Member for North Wiltshire said, because I have sympathy for his argument. However, until I had heard the debate, I was not sure whether the amendment was the best way to deal with the point. The Minister addressed the lacuna in the picture that was drawn up. There is perhaps a logical connection between knowing permission and the person who is knowingly permitting it. However, I still have concerns. The Minister said that he would provide the Committee with a note from the Department's lawyers to clarify any residual matters on this point, and on that basis I feel reassured. Having listened to the Minister, I cannot support the amendment.

James Gray: Like the Minister, I am no lawyer and would not claim to be. There is definitely a technical question here. The law with regard to the ownership of land seems to me to be complex and difficult, and the way in which clause 45(3) reads into clause 4(1) is particularly worrying. Clause 4(1) does not say:
''A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits land which belongs to him to be entered''
 for the purpose of carrying out the crime. In other words, the intention is not included in clause 4(1). It is still slightly worrying that somebody who owns an interest in land may inadvertently permit a crime to be carried out on his land without knowing about it. He may allow the criminals to enter his land and to use it in the course of the commission of an offence under subsection (1), but he would not know that it would be so used. However, the subsection does not contain the word ''purpose'', so the owner does not know that people intend to commit a crime when they go on to it. The words used are ''in the course of'' rather than ''for the purpose of''.

Alun Michael: Clause 4(1) is explicit. It says:
''A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits land which belongs to him to be entered or used in the course of the commission of an offence under section 1.''
 Ownership therefore includes partial ownership, so the words ''knowingly permits'' are clear. The hon. Gentleman is wrong.

James Gray: The Minister should not jump to his feet so quickly. I, too, read the clause out and my point has nothing to do with the words ''knowingly permits'', which mean allowing people to go on to land during the commission of the offence, not for the purpose of committing the offence. The person who allows someone to go on to the land in the course of committing the offence may not know that an offence is being committed. Clause 4(1) states:
''A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits land which belongs to him to be entered or used in the course of the commission of an offence under section 1.''
 The problem is the words ''in the course'' of carrying out the offence, not the words ''for the purpose'' of carrying out the offence. The person owning the land may not know that that is the other person's purpose. 
 Textual analysis becomes tiresome, but I shall give way to the Minister.

Alun Michael: It is clear that the person must know that he is contributing to the commission of an offence. I understand now that it is worth re-reading the clause a number of times to understand the hon. Gentleman's point. I think that his interpretation is wrong, but I shall deal with the matter authoritatively in the response that I promised.

James Gray: Textual analysis is tiresome and tedious, and is a matter for lawyers. Neither the Minister nor I is a lawyer, so perhaps we have had enough of that. However, I think that the word ''purposefully'' or ''intentionally'' in clause 4 would be better. The Minister is prepared to ask his advisers and lawyers to look at the matter to ensure that no inadvertent crime could be committed, which is what we are keen to avoid. I am reassured, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Gray: I beg to move amendment No. 362, in
clause 45, page 18, leave out line 20.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 363, in
clause 45, page 18, line 21, leave out 'or', and insert 
 'at the time of the commission of an offence, and'.

James Gray: Amendment No. 362 and, to some degree, amendment No. 363, bear some resemblance to amendment No. 361. They refer to whether a person could be convicted of inadvertently committing a crime. Simple ownership of a dog that is used in the commission of an offence should not necessarily make that person liable to criminal prosecution, nor should simply having charge of that dog. The amendments would ensure that the offence of someone knowingly permitting a dog belonging to them to be used for hunting would apply to a dog that someone was in charge of and had control of at the time the offence was committed.
 If someone owns a dog but is not in control of it when the crime is committed, why should they be liable? Equally, it might be possible for someone to be in control of the dog and, therefore, committing the offence without having ownership of it. The purpose of the amendments is to rectify that anomaly. 
 Common law currently makes adequate provision for situations in which a person aids, abets or counsels the commission of an offence or provides the means—the ownership of the land or the dogs—and we debated that on clause 4. The point is that it is wholly irrelevant who owns a dog. The concept of ownership is unhelpful. A family dog does not belong to one individual. A family of four people having four dogs would be said to own them jointly. The concept of ownership does not help in pursuit of animal welfare, which is what the Bill is supposed to be about. 
 The drafting seeks to prevent a person from knowingly permitting a third party to use their dog for hunting. Whether that person owns the dog is not important. If I own a dog and give it to a friend to look after and an offence is committed while that person is in charge of it, I would be liable to prosecution. That is a serious possibility because the definition of hunting is woefully imprecise and includes dog walkers whose dogs search for a scent. If I know that someone is likely to walk my dog and commit an offence, I commit an offence of knowingly permitting a dog to be used to commit an offence. That is madness. A person who uses any dog, regardless of ownership, and who is in charge and control of it at the time of the offence is the person who should be guilty. The person who actually has control of the dog should be the person who commits the offence, rather than the person who owns the dog. The ownership is incidental. 
 The offence created in clause 4 should relate to the person with charge and control of the dog at the time the offence of knowingly permitting that dog to be used for hunting was committed, not at the time the offence of hunting was committed. The amendment is straightforward and would prevent the inadvertent 
 conviction of someone whose dog was used by someone else to commit an offence. I hope that the Government will the see sense of it.

Alun Michael: I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. As he rightly says, the Bill defines the circumstances in which a dog belongs to a person. That includes three elements; where a person owns it, where a person is in charge of it and where a person has control of it. Amendment No. 362 would narrow the definition, removing from its scope the person who owns the dog. To narrow the definition of when a person belongs to a dog—[Hon. Members: ''What?''] Sorry, when a dog belongs to a person. I realise that there was an element of truth in my slip there. To narrow the scope of the definition of when a dog belongs to a person would weaken the Bill.
 Under clause 4(2): 
''A person commits an offence if he knowingly permits a dog which belongs to him to be used in the course of the commission of an offence under section 1.''
 To show how the amendment would introduce a real problem, I pose a question. If a dog owner knowingly permits another person to use his dog for illegal hunting, why should he not be guilty of an offence? That is a straightforward question, which exposes the mistake that the hon. Gentleman is making in the amendment. 
 The hon. Gentleman used one or two illustrations. An innocent walker cannot be found guilty because if the dog hunts and the innocent walker does not, he is not committing an offence. That returns us to intention, although I hesitate to return to that. Intention is an inherent part of the concept of hunting, as we have explored several times. If an innocent walker cannot be guilty, a person who lends a dog to an innocent walker cannot be guilty except in the unlikely and slightly absurd situation of the person lending the dog intending the innocent walker to go hunting. That reductio ad absurdum demonstrates that the clause does not give rise to the problems that the hon. Gentleman fears. 
 Amendment No. 363, too, seeks to change the scope of the definition of when a dog belongs to a person. The present wording is clear; a dog belongs to a person if he is in charge of it. There is no need to clarify that definition with the explanation that the person had to be in charge of the dog at the time of the offence. The relevance to the offence of the fact that a person is in charge of a dog will depend on the circumstances of the individual case. Clearly, courts will have to make decisions on that by looking at the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence.

James Gray: I am slightly puzzled. Let us imagine that I am in control of a dog that was used by someone different in the course of an offence last month. Surely, the clause would allow the constable to arrest me because I am in control of the dog today, even though I had nothing whatever to do with the crime.

Alun Michael: In that case, one could not be guilty of knowingly being involved in the commission of the offence. One would have an absolute protection. Again, I understand the protection that the hon. Gentleman seeks, but I can reassure him that it is not
 needed. It would be an absurd misinterpretation of the law to say that someone was in charge of the dog and associated with the commission of an offence about which they knew nothing, in relation to which they had no intention and, at the material time, did not have control of the dog. No court would seriously entertain that. I can fairly confidently say that even were such circumstances brought to the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service, the case would be sent back immediately with a tart note on the file, since the offence could clearly not have been committed.

Edward Garnier: I want to suggest one or two examples so that the Minister can help me. I have no doubt that the purpose behind the provisions is to prevent people from hiding behind the criminal acts of others. Unfortunately, whether I approve of the definition that says that those people are committing criminal acts is neither here nor there in the context of our discussion.
 I want to paint a picture for the Minister to see what his response is. Let us assume that I am the owner of one or two male dogs and own a reasonably large garden. One afternoon, I happen to be sitting in my garden with my dogs at my feet. There may come a time when they become uninterested in my company.

Nicholas Soames: Never.

Edward Garnier: I hasten to assure my hon. Friend that this is an entirely hypothetical example.

Nicholas Soames: A doggist slur.

Edward Garnier: Exactly. My dogs set off around the garden, doing what dogs do. For all I know, they may discover that a little farther away is a bitch on heat. They set off, guided by the scent of the bitch, but during their travels they become interested in the scent of quarry—an animal for which hunting is not permitted under the legislation.
 As the owner of the dogs, I may be considered to be in charge of them. Under road traffic legislation that deals with the control of a motor car while under the influence of drink, one does not physically have to be driving the car to have control of it. My dogs may perform an act of illegal hunting while I think that they have gone off to do whatever—in fact, I do not care what they have gone off to do. One might say that I was reckless.

Nicholas Soames: In the course of this extremely unsuitable story which, not only in context but in substance, is completely inexplicable to some of the younger members of the Committee, I would be grateful if my hon. and learned Friend would explain in more detail the nature of the quarry for which his dogs are searching.

Edward Garnier: I am not a dog psychoanalyst, but I assume that the dogs that I own under the terms of clause 45(4)(a) have set off on a frolic of their own and have gone in search of a bitch on heat. During the search, they are distracted by the scent of a hare, a fox or some other animal that the Bill makes it unlawful to hunt. As the owner of the dogs and as someone who may, under law, have charge of them—in the event, I could not care less one way or the other what they are
 doing—I may be charged with a section 1 offence because animals that are in my ownership, perhaps as a matter of law under my charge, are hunting a wild mammal.

Rob Marris: I suspect that the hon. and learned Gentleman will not agree with me when I say that he is speaking absolute nonsense. He has not read clause 45(2). In his example, he would not be engaging or participating in a pursuit, nor would he be employing a dog in a pursuit.

Edward Garnier: That all depends on whether I am reckless. I can read subsection (2) as well as the hon. Gentleman. Many strange examples have been produced in the Committee that will bring into the sphere of criminality many people who consider themselves to be innocent. I want to ensure that the Minister understands the potential ambit of the legislation.
 I was assured by the right hon. Gentleman before the short recess that innocent dog walkers will not come under the threat of criminal proceedings. The Government have also tried to reassure us in regard to whether people will be caught in the criminal law. However, when we are expanding criminal law to cover those who own dogs or have the charge of a dog, we must ensure that the public who will be caught by the Bill know where they stand. We are not dealing only with the actions of a human being, as we would be with the human crime of a bank robbery, murder or assault. We are dealing with the thought process or state of mind of a human being and the actions of a dog or dogs. Therefore, although to some extent the example that I am producing is worthy of ridicule, it is not wholly fanciful. The Bill has thrown up examples of problems that might, at first blush, seem ridiculous and fanciful but which, when analysed, are likely to have unforeseen consequences. In so far as I have any power as an Opposition Member, I am not in the business of allowing the House to pass legislation that produces foreseen ridiculous consequences. We have to tolerate unforeseen ridiculous consequences.

Nicholas Soames: Although my hon. and learned Friend is uncharacteristically introducing a doggist attitude into the debate, he is absolutely right about unforeseen consequences. In an earlier sitting when he was not in the Committee, the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Foster) supported an amendment to ban the use of terriers working underground. As a consequence, gamekeepers will not be able to do their job properly—an unforeseen consequence of a ban on hunting.

Edward Garnier: That was one of the unforeseen consequences that I was able to draw to the attention of about 250 supporters of the Grafton hunt at a hunt supper last night. To a man and a woman, they simply held their hands up and said, ''We do not believe this. Is this the sort of legislation that this Parliament, of which you are a member, is passing?'' I said, ''I fear so''.
 To return to my example, I want to be assured that, when the Minister finally puts the Bill to the general 
 public as an Act, innocent people will not be caught by it. I mean not people who are innocent in the sense that they have not been found guilty, but people who have not applied their minds to every activity that a dog might get up to, although they have a general idea that dogs chase things and that, if dogs are not kept on a lead and their minds set on a number of dog-like activities, they may bring within the criminal law the individual sitting or walking in his garden who has let his dogs leave his immediate personal vicinity. 
 I heard what the Minister said about the unlikelihood of the Crown Prosecution Service doing this, that or the other, but we are not talking simply about the CPS. I have every faith that sensible Crown prosecutors will chuck out at first-assessment stage 99.9 per cent. of the ridiculous stories that are brought to their attention with a view to prosecution. However, that does not prevent us from having to anticipate the so-called prescribed animal welfare organisations or their supporters running around the country looking for examples to demonstrate that the law is insufficient to deal with their purposes—their desire for a total ban on any form of hunting. If they can find the most ridiculous examples, which either demonstrate the Bill's inefficacy or cause the Government, the CPS or those who support hunting the greatest amount of embarrassment, they will use those examples. They will take out private prosecutions, which, although they may not lead to a conviction, let alone to a trial, will none the less engage the public purse in huge expense and they will engage the CPS in wasted time and effort in assessing whether it is worth advising the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney-General to take over a prosecution and issue a nolle. They will engage the court service in a lot of wasted time. 
 Unless we are careful, out of my fanciful example—no doubt amusing to some—will flow a host of unforeseen, expensive, ridiculous and time-wasting consequences. The purpose of my intervention is to warn the Minister that it is one thing to pass legislation with a large majority that has the intended purpose of providing a regime of licensed hunting. It is quite another to translate that intention into practical and workable law, and a regime of law that has and deserves the respect of the public.

Lembit Öpik: The hon. and learned Gentleman's example may be worthy of a Dr. Seuss book. Nevertheless there is an underlying issue that we have discussed before, but was resolved by one of the discussions during the Portcullis house hearings last September. I had an exchange with a Professor Linzey, who was very much in favour of a ban on hunting with dogs. It transpired that he owned some cats. When I asked him how he felt about the prospect of his cats killing mammals in his garden, he said emphatically that he could not be held responsible for actions carried out by his cats of their own volition.
 I assume that Professor Linzey and others would be consistent and transpose the same conditions to dogs, or it would indeed be doggist in the animal kingdom to treat cats and dogs differently. If that is the case—the Minister may be able to confirm that—the concerns of the hon. and learned Gentleman do not really arise. 
 Many people who own dogs, with the best will in the world, will see their dogs chasing other animals and sometimes killing them. That is what dogs do. It is important that we provide an assurance to individuals that they will not end up in prison simply because, while they were walking their dog, it ran off and killed another animal, such as a fox cub. We all know that dogs have a propensity to do such things and if a dog has done so once, it is likely to do so again. I would like the Minister to put on record an assurance to individuals who have not set out to kill animals, but are reasonably sure that their dogs will behave in such a way from time to time.

Andrew George: The scenario that my hon. Friend paints is worthy of consideration. However, does he accept that a similar scenario exists as far as farmers are concerned, especially those with young lambs and sheep? In that case, the animal killed by a dog may be a farmed animal. Would he agree that the approach should remain the same for dog owners whether they be resident at home and not taking care of the dog, or taking the dog out for a walk in the countryside without a lead? Owners should take full responsibility for their dogs.

Lembit Öpik: I see what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I have not thought it through in detail, but I feel that there is a qualitative difference between a dog killing livestock and a dog killing an animal that is regarded as a pest. I do not believe that anyone present in the Committee is questioning that foxes are pests. We are not ascribing some special status to the fox. However, it seems much more likely that a dog running around in a park will kill a fox, than that it will kill a lamb or another item of livestock. We went through this in the hearings last September, but I do not recall anyone making the point in Committee—perhaps I missed it.

James Gray: We did and you missed it.

Lembit Öpik: In that case, if the Minister is satisfied that it is already covered in the record, I agree that I have said all that I need to say. I am sorry that the ridiculous hours that we have passed have prevented me from being present for all the sittings. I hope that—[Interruption.] We can talk about the ridiculous hours outside the Committee. I simply hope that the Minister will give an assurance that what he said before in Committee still applies to the matter. I am sorry if I have unnecessarily detained the Committee.

Rob Marris: First, I want to respond to the issue raised by the hon. Member for St. Ives (Andrew George). Working from memory—I hope that he will forgive me—I think that dogs harrying livestock is an offence under the Animals Act 1971. He may well be aware of that.
 I want briefly—I stress that word—to draw the Committee's attention to a circle. The amendments relate to clause 45(4), which refers to a dog belonging to somebody. That phrase appears in clause 4(2), which refers to the ''commission of an offence'' under clause 1. Clause 1 refers to the offence in relation to hunting and that takes us back to clause 45(2). We have to bear all that in mind. 
 The hon. and learned Member for Harborough talked about his two dogs running around in his garden, which, knowing him, is probably the size of Leicestershire, and the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik) talked about the same thing. In that context, we have to consider clause 45(2) and the circle I have drawn. Clause 45(2) refers to one or more dogs being ''employed''. We have had that debate and you rightly would not let me repeat it, Mr. Stevenson. Clause 45(2)(a) refers to a person who 
''engages or participates in the pursuit of a wild mammal''.
 Cats have already been mentioned. Everyone else on the Committee seems to have declared their pets. We have two cats called Wayne and Gretzky. Those who are interested in ice hockey, which is probably a minority, will know that Wayne Gretzky was the greatest ice hockey player ever. Sadly, our two cats sometimes hunt birds in our garden. Occasionally, they even catch and eat them or deposit them at our feet. However, I am not employing those cats in the pursuit of birds or squirrels and I am certainly not engaging or participating in that. I am not hunting, even though the animals, acting on their instincts and of their own volition, are. The fear about dog walkers and pests and so on is all nonsense. It has just been dreamed up to create fear among members of the community who may be following the Bill.

Alun Michael: I have a couple of points to add to what I have already said. First, the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire seemed to be pursuing equality in the animal kingdom by comparing the behaviour of dogs and cats. I suggest that it is not helpful to pursue that line; one has to pursue logic and common sense in relation to an individual's actions and decisions about particular animals. I can assure him that the innocent walker issue has been dealt with in previous debates; in fact, it has been dealt with exhaustively during the passage of every relevant Bill that has come before the House. It is a regular visitor in Committees and the position is clear.
 The hon. Member for St. Ives was right to illuminate the discussion by saying that there are comparisons with the responsibility of the innocent walker taking a dog into fields at lambing time. What matters in relation to the commission of an offence is what the owner does or does not do and their intentions. In the circumstances to which he refers, it is the responsibility of the owner to keep the dog under control. That is accepted by dog owners and felt strongly by farmers. If a dog owner knows that a dog has a proclivity to worry sheep, that knowledge means that their responsibility to take precautions becomes even greater. That is when their intentions and behaviour in relation to their knowledge of the animal are particularly relevant. 
 On the intervention of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, I certainly admire his creative talent. The publishers of light fiction should know about it, because his mind has the potential to produce several novels that I would look forward to reading. 
 It is the intention of the owner of the dog that is relevant to hunting. We have explored that subject on 
 several occasions. I am not totally sure whether the sexual activity of dogs is relevant to hunting, but I am sure that it is outside the scope of the Bill. I believe that someone quoted in Horse and Hound not long ago described a day's hunting as ''better than sex'', but canine behaviour seems to be more clearly focused than human behaviour. I have considerable doubts about the illustration that the hon. and learned Gentleman offered. 
 I emphasise that the intentions and actions of the human being are considered when a decision is made about whether an offence has been committed. Of course, a dog must be associated with the activity—otherwise, we would not be discussing hunting with dogs—but, clearly, it is the intentions and actions of the human being that are important. 
 Having a general idea that a dog chases other animals does not amount to committing an offence knowingly. As the hon. and learned Gentleman said, the Crown Prosecution Service must examine the evidence of any alleged commission of an offence. That is the way the system works. That happens for any offence that Parliament has ever decided should be open to prosecution. We depend on making good law, rather than worrying about the perverse intentions of campaigners on either side of a political debate about an issue.

Edward Garnier: I am prepared to accept the anticipatory reviews of my great works of fiction, which, no doubt, will entertain the Minister in due course, but I want to take him back to the question of intention. We have discussed it in previous sittings, but it is not good enough simply to say that the human being must have the requisite intention. As the Minister knows, ''intention'' does not always mean a deliberate plan to do something. It can sometimes mean a reckless disregard for the consequences of one's actions. Therefore, the reckless disregard of a dog owner, within his own property, that his dog might engage in an activity that will bring him into the ambit of the criminal law is something of which the Minister should aware and about which he should be able to assure the public.

Alun Michael: Sure, but the interpretation of intention is not changed by the Bill. It is clear in the generality of the law.
 I wish to strengthen my point about unnecessary prosecutions. There is nothing in the Bill, as there is nothing in any legislation that comes before Parliament, to prevent unjustified or unreasonable private prosecutions being brought by individuals or organisations. How could there be? However, the courts are well equipped, as are the CPS and the police, to respond to such prosecutions and to prevent their being used to achieve improper ends. In fact, the courts are expected to impose cost penalties on vexatious litigants. 
 We have taken an interesting ramble around the context of the clause and the amendment, but I return to the question that I asked earlier. If a dog owner knowingly permits another person to use his dog for 
 illegal hunting, should not he be guilty of an offence? The amendment should not be accepted, because it is right to ask that question.

James Gray: I sometimes wish that I were a lawyer paid by the hour, as are some colleagues, but I am a layman. On reading again the Bill and our amendments to clause 45(3) and (4), I suspect that I drafted the amendments late one night with a cold towel around my head. The word ''knowingly'' in clause 4 probably allays most of my concerns about clause 45, and the amendments may have been drafted without due consideration of it. You will laugh when you hear me say this, Mr. Stevenson, but on this occasion the Minister is correct and the amendments are unnecessary, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Gray: I beg to move amendment No. 364, in
clause 45, page 18, line 26, after 'abandoned', insert 
 'after appropriate notification to the applicant by the registrar'.
 This is a technical and clarifying amendment to ensure that the registrar is not entitled to decide that an application has been abandoned or finally determined unless he lets the applicant know. The role of the registrar and the tribunal is decreasing and, if Labour Members are to be believed and they intend to ban foxhunting outright on Report, the Bill will become the Bill to control the hunting of ferrets, mink and stoats, so the registrar may have little to do. That is an important point because we are discussing whether applications to the registrar will stand. If deer, hare coursing, hare hunting and foxhunting were banned outright, all that would be left for the registrar to do would be to deal with the hunting of ferrets, stoats and mink.

Rob Marris: Wild boar.

James Gray: And wild boar. The role of the registrar will become less and less important as time goes on and the title of the Bill may have to be changed. None the less, if someone has made an application and, however unlikely, it is later thought to have been abandoned, the amendment would require the registrar to make appropriate notification to the applicant before it was allowed to be abandoned. That seems to be a reasonable safeguard for the interests of the applicant.

Alun Michael: As the hon. Gentleman said, the amendment would change the time at which an application is treated as finally determined. At present, it is treated as finally determined when the registrar has made his decision or, if an appeal is made, when the tribunal has determined that appeal. Under the amendment, the time of final determination would be after appropriate notification of the decision to the applicant by the registrar.
 I do not think that the change proposed in the amendment is necessary and I cannot see any benefit in it. As soon as the registrar makes a decision on the application, whether it is to grant or to refuse it, he will notify the applicant of the decision. Indeed, details of the way in which he carries out those bureaucratic functions will be set out in regulations. During the 
 transition period, hunting may continue until an application submitted before the Bill is fully enforced—that will be within a specified period—is fully determined. The definition in clause 45(5) makes it clear that an application will be finally determined only when the registrar has reached his decision and the tribunal has determined any appeal, or the time limit for appealing has been exhausted. It follows that the registrar's decision does not itself lead to immediate prohibition of the hunting in question if there is an appeal, so it is unnecessary to refer to notification to the hunt at that stage. I shall resist the amendment.

James Gray: The Minister's oratory is overwhelming and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 46 and 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 - Consequential Amendments

James Gray: I beg to move amendment No. 61, in
schedule 3, page 26, leave out lines 28 to 30.
 We now come to a more substantial part of this morning's business, which deals with an error in the consequential amendments to other Bills in schedule 3 on page 26. The amendment would omit the reference to the Protection of Badgers Act 1992. At present that Act allows registered hunts to stop up badger setts as an essential part of enabling hunts to continue an effective role of managing fox populations. Incidentally, it also protects the badger setts. The amendment would allow registered hunts to continue to stop up badger setts. 
 I may want to explain the position in greater detail in legal terms in a moment, but, in layman's terms, under the 1992 Act a hunt is allowed to go round the setts in advance and stop them up, so that the hunted fox does not go to ground in them. That enables the setts to be protected to some degree and digging out the fox, which we have discussed, to continue. 
 The Protection of Badgers Act is plain about the way in which stopping up can occur. For example, it does not allow certain material to be used to stop up the sett. It simply means that the incidence of foxes going down badger setts becomes less. Therefore, the sett is protected and there is a greater likelihood of catching and killing the fox.

Michael Foster: Would the hon. Gentleman also say that a consequence of the amendment and the process of stopping up that he describes is that the chase can be prolonged because the fox cannot go into a badger sett?

James Gray: That would be a good argument in favour of ruling out stopping up altogether, but it is not what we are discussing here. We can stop up rabbit holes and all sorts of holes; there is no law against doing so. If the hon. Gentleman believes that we should give all foxes the greatest possible chance to get away, he is right to say that the way to do that is to
 ban all forms of stopping up. However, we are discussing whether badger setts should continue to be allowed to be stopped up, as the 1992 Act allows, and not the purpose or intention behind doing so. We are talking specifically about badger setts and that Act.
 Under section 8(7) of the 1992 Act a specific defence is created for hounds marking at a badger sett, provided that they are withdrawn as soon as reasonably practicable. Marking is the moment when hounds make a particular noise over a particular hole to indicate that there is a fox in it. That defence would be lost as a result of the Bill. However, there is no reason why that would make hounds less likely to mark at a badger sett. Indeed, they would probably be more likely to. If all the badger setts in the country were left open and unstopped, there would be an increased likelihood of a fox going into them. That would mean that the hunts would risk prosecution under parts of the 1992 Act. 
 The interesting legal point—I shall read it out with some care, because, as I said earlier, I am not a lawyer—is that a potential defence would remain under section 8(3) of the 1992 Act, which says: 
''A person is not guilty of an offence under section 3(a), (c) or (e) above if he shows that his action was the incidental result of a lawful operation and could not reasonably have been avoided.''
 If that provision was a sufficient defence for hounds marking at a badger sett, why was the 1992 Act drafted to include a specific exemption for hounds marking in section 8(7)? The obvious reason was to avoid vexatious litigation. Therefore, if section 8(7) were removed, every hunt would be open to prosecution on the facts of each case as to whether the marking at the badger sett 
''could not reasonably have been avoided''.
 That is an open invitation to every anti-hunting organisation to take hunts to court and risk their registration. The intervention from the hon. Member for Worcester a moment ago shows their thinking. They believe that the purpose of stopping up is to prolong the chase, whereas in our view it is to protect badgers and the badger sett. 
 If the Minister can assure us that a registered hunt would be protected from prosecution because section 8(3) of the 1992 Act has the same effect as section 8(7), a registered hunt could continue to hunt. None the less, one indirect consequence of the repeal proposed in the Bill would be an increased chance of hounds marking at a badger sett—foxes will more readily go to ground in them because hunts will no longer be able to stop them up. 
 If the Minister cannot give the assurance that the defence under section 8(3) of the 1992 Act has the same effect as that under section 8(7), it begins to look as if this is an attempt to make it impossible for hunts to operate even if they can become registered. Otherwise, if a hunt manages, against all the odds, to become registered, it will be unable to operate because of the danger of the hounds marking at a sett and the resulting expense of a prosecution being brought. That would be the consequence of deleting the exemption under the Protection of Badgers Act 1992. If it became a prosecutable offence to mark at and to stop up a 
 badger sett, if would be very difficult to chase foxes with dogs as a pest control operative under the Bill's registration system. 
 It is interesting to remember that the anti-hunting organisations likely to test cases in the courts could also be the prescribed organisations under the Bill, and they will benefit from Government grants when they do so. Moreover, reducing the hunts' ability to perform a fox-control role will make them less able to pass the utility test. As drafted, the consequential repeal threatens hunts' ability to dispatch humanely foxes that may well be sick or injured above ground. The injured or sick that take refuge in a badger sett will have to be abandoned to die a lingering and painful death. Legislation that will create such unnecessary suffering seems ill thought through. 
 The stopping up of setts conducted according to Masters of Foxhounds Association rules and under the 1992 Act prevents avoidable disturbance of those setts and causes no harm to the badgers. I have a copy of the MFHA's yellow card with me, which lays down the way in which badger setts must be stopped. That is carried by masters at all times and by other people involved in the stopping such as terrier men. It plainly lays down that such things as bundles of sticks, faggots, paper sacks or empty or filled materials may be used but not until after the midnight before hunting and that they must be removed after hunting before midnight. The MFHA lays down such details carefully to ensure that the only purpose in stopping up a badger sett is to stop a fox going down it on that day's hunting. The stopping must then be removed to allow the badger proper access. The MFHA regulations also state that hunts cannot use hard materials such as tin and cans. They are precise regulations on how stopping up should occur.

Rob Marris: Can the hon. Gentleman remind the Committee what the Burns inquiry found when presented with evidence that some of the stopping up was carried out illegally, and did not correspond to the handy-dandy card from which he has just read?

James Gray: The hon. Gentleman makes a useful point. He justifies what the Bill will do not because it is a good thing in itself but because some extremists might not be carrying out practices according to the rules, so he thinks that that is good reason to stop everyone else from carrying them out. However, I remind him what Lord Burns said on that. It is useful to have a healthy discussion on the Burns approach to stopping up. Paragraph 9.21 of his report said:
''Another practice which gives rise to particular concern is that of stopping up foxes' earths, badger setts and other possible refuges before a foxhunt begins. As we noted in Chapter 7, we received a good deal of evidence about this activity, especially from badger watch groups. They argue that there are still far too many instances in which hunts and others are illegally stopping-up badger setts by using hard material or soil cut back from the sett itself.''
 Against that: 
''The Countryside Alliance argued that there was no evidence of any malpractice''
 by sensible, organised hunts at all. It accepted that there was a lack of—

Alun Michael: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

James Gray: In a second. Lord Burns reacted to that alliance—[Interruption.] If the Minister will contain himself for one second and allow me to finish the quotation from Lord Burns he can then come back with his counter-quote. I should like to continue with what I believe to be a quotation from Lord Burns.

Alun Michael: On that very point.

James Gray: If the Minister will contain himself, I am quoting from what I believe to be the Burns report.

Alun Michael: No.

James Gray: The Minister says ''No'' from a sedentary position. If he will allow me to continue with the quote, I am happy for him to come back in after that. Unless I am mistaken—I shall be happy to be corrected in a moment—the Burns report, in paragraph 9.22, says:
''The Countryside Alliance argued that there was no evidence of any malpractice. Whilst we accept that there is a lack of firm evidence linking malpractice to the hunts, we do not think we can disregard entirely the written and oral evidence we received from badger protection groups and their supporters on this issue.''
 In paragraph 9.23 of the Burns report—I am happy to be corrected—he says: 
''We recognise that badgers are now more numerous than at the time when they were first given legal protection. We also recognise that, if hunts were not permitted to stop up badger setts, foxes would be more likely to go to ground there and would have to be left. Similarly we recognise that if the same prohibition applied to foxes' earths many more would escape unscathed. However, consideration should be given to both of these issues in the absence of a ban.''
 In paragraph 9.24, he continues 
''One option, in the absence of a ban on hunting, would be to remove the present exemption for hunts.''

Alun Michael: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I think that it will be helpful to Hansard if I make the following point. In paragraph 9.22, the sentence reads, as the hon. Gentleman rightly quoted it after I sought to intervene:
''The Countryside Alliance argued that there was no evidence of any malpractice.''
 The hon. Gentleman quoted that sentence and added the words ''by sensible and well-organised hunts.'' The Countryside Alliance in the Burns report seems to deny any evidence of malpractice whatever. It was not conditioned in the way that the hon. Gentleman sought to suggest. As long as he confirms that the words were added by him, I accept his right to interpret the Burns report, but the report did not include those added words.

James Gray: I do not intend to get into a biblical, textual analysis of the Burns report, which the Minister seems to love doing so much. It is astonishing that he relies so much on a document that has otherwise been entirely ignored on questions such as the banning of hare hunting or terrier work. He has ignored Burns, the Portcullis house hearings and the consultation.
 None the less, the Minister is right. The words I inserted referred to the second sentence in paragraph 9.22 rather than the first. The Minister was right to pick me up on that, but I do not believe it is a very important point. I said 
''The Countryside Alliance argued that there was no evidence of any malpractice''—
 insert by J. Gray, Member of Parliament for North Wiltshire, ''of organised hunts''— 
''Whilst we accept that there is a lack of firm evidence lacking malpractice to the hunts''.
 In other words, my insertion was paraphrasing precisely what Lord Burns' second sentence said. When discussing whether to allow the stopping up of badger setts, I do not think that a textual analysis of the precise wording of the Burns report achieves anything at all. I hope that the Minister will try to avoid doing so. 
 I would much prefer to refer to the speech by Lord Burns in the House of Lords debate on 12 March 2001. I will try and quote without parentheses. If I parenthesise, I shall make it plain that I am doing so. Burns stated: 
''Secondly, we were concerned about the impact on animal welfare of a number of practices, including autumn or cub hunting, digging out, stopping up of earths and interfering with the flight of the quarry. We suggested ways in which action could be taken in the mean time to ban or curtail some of those activities even if Parliament decided against an overall ban on hunting with dogs.
The problem is that in each case it is difficult to impose rules that should apply in all circumstances and in all regions. There are clearly some cases that one would wish to deal with differently from others. A licensing authority could have an important role in judging the circumstances in which to grant licences and when to reject an application. That might include taking account of successful prosecutions brought against some of the activities.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12 March 2001; Vol. 623, c. 535.]
 The important point is that Burns says that there are some cases where stopping up makes sense, but others where it does not. Textual analysis does not achieve much, but the combination of the report and his speech suggests to me that a blanket banning of stopping up of badger setts would not achieve anything. The responses from the Independent Supervisory Authority for Hunting were forwarded to the Minister on 5 July 2002. The MFHA's response to the Minister's questions was as follows: 
''Stopping up is essential to enable fox control to be effective so it is widely practised. If stopping is prohibited foxes may not be found and so could not be hunted effectively. Stopping of badger setts prevents foxes running to ground in them and consequently the hounds from marking to ground at set entrances.''
 The fox population could not be managed if stopping up were prevented. 
 Although Burns had concerns about the stopping of badger setts, he recognised that banning the practice outright will impact upon the ability of hunts to control foxes, saying: 
''it is difficult to impose rules that should apply in all circumstances and in all regions''.
 There is a role for the licensing authority in setting the limitations on that activity. It would make sense in the context of the structure of the Bill as originally printed—the changes in Committee probably have made it less sensible—for the registrar to consider the activity. 
 It is important to understand why the stopping of badger setts is currently allowed and that, properly conducted, poses no threat to the welfare of badgers. Stopping is an aid to effective fox management. The 
 MFHA lays down strict rules on how earth stopping is carried out. The hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) suggested that there is malpractice in earth stopping, but evidence is hard to find and largely anecdotal. During the Burns inquiry oral sessions, Deadline 2000 was asked about the extent of hard stopping. The only evidence it offered came from Kevin Hill, an International Fund for Animal Welfare monitor, who described his 
''feeling that it is widespread''.
 That was the only evidence for the occurrence of hard stopping. 
 The National Federation of Badger Groups submission to the Burns inquiry argued that hunting had a detrimental effect on badger welfare, but it did not provide any evidence to support that claim. In 1996, aware of the many unfounded allegations made about the stopping of badger setts by anti-hunting associations, the then British Field Sports Society—we liked that name—which is now the Countryside Alliance commissioned the University of Sussex to undertake research on the effect of stopping up the entrances to badger setts on the respiratory environment within the sett. The report by Mr. Roper and Mr. Kemenes entitled, ''Effect of Blocking of Entrances on the Internal Environment of Badger (Meles Meles) Set'' appeared in the Journal of Applied Ecology in 1997. They found that the blocking of sett entrances does not disturb the within-sett environment of badgers. The scientific evidence in that report makes it the ultimate learned treatise on the blocking of entrances of badger setts.

Rob Marris: Will the hon. Gentleman remind the Committee of that report's terms of reference? Did the report not concern the respiratory environment?

James Gray: That is indeed the case. The investigation was into whether stopping up had an effect on the respiratory environment within the sett. The conclusion was that it did not affect the respiratory environment. It was alleged that badgers suffocate because of stopping up, but the study makes it plain that that was not the case. Of course, that is different from the question whether it is sensible to allow stopping up from the point of view of foxhunting. There are those who argue that all stopping up of badger setts must be awful because the badgers must suffocate; the scientific evidence makes it plain that that is not the case.
 The research shows that there is no evidence that the dispensation for hunts to stop up badger setts presently allowed in the Badger Act 1992 should be withdrawn. There is no evidence of a detrimental effect on the badgers, but there is plenty of evidence that there would be a benefit from the point of view of killing the maximum number of foxes. Nobody has said in Committee that killing a fox is necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, most people on both sides of the argument have acknowledged that killing badgers is good and necessary. [Hon. Members: ''Badgers?''] If I said ''badgers'', it was, of course, a slip of the tongue. What I meant to say was ''foxes''. I am a great badger lover, but under no circumstances would I advocate their death. I leave aside the whole question of bovine 
 TB and Her Royal Highness Princess Anne, who has made it plain that she believes there is a direct link between bovine TB and badgers. There may be arguments in favour of the culling of badgers by the Government under scientific conditions. 
 I meant that the stopping up of badger setts had great utility with regard to the killing of foxes. The reality is that the fox population is too large. If any pest control is to be left in place after the passage of the Bill, we must allow badger setts to be stopped up, so that the proper control of foxes can continue. 
 The inadvertent ending of the defence of the stopping up of badger setts is a mistake. Will the defence under section 8(3) of the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 continue, even if the Bill would delete the defence under section 8(7)? I may have got those numbers the wrong way round. In other words, will that defence continue, despite the passing of the consequential amendment? That is the central point. Are there circumstances under which hunts can continue to stop up badger setts? If not, will the Minister accept that that will make registered hunts extremely difficult to operate, with the unintended consequence that more foxes will continue to live?

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman quoted Lord Burns in full and, after my intervention, did so accurately. He also made the absurd allegation that I have ignored the Burns report. That is totally untrue. It is an allegation that is not worthy of him. At the beginning of our proceedings both sides of the debate asked me to take the Burns findings seriously and not to reopen them. I have done so. I have also sought to look at precisely what Lord Burns says and at what he says in full. One problem that has been acknowledged on a variety of occasions—although that has not stopped it being repeated—is that people tend to take part of a sentence or comment by Lord Burns, add their own thought and present that as the findings of the Burns report. I am glad to have been able to help the hon. Gentleman not to commit that offence this morning, although the intention may have been there.

James Gray: Will the Minister kindly remind us where Lord Burns recommends the outright banning of terrier work and hare hunting?

Alun Michael: If the hon. Gentleman will read the Burns report, he will see that it reflects the concerns about terrier work in the evidence provided to Lord Burns. The report did not provide conclusions or a blueprint for legislation. It was my responsibility to take it as my starting point, as I have done, and not to abandon or reopen it—I have done neither of those things—but to use it as the platform on which to hold extensive consultation in order to draft legislation. That is what I have done.
 The hon. Gentleman went on to make the wild allegation that I have ignored the Portcullis house hearings. I have done no such thing; far from it. I have taken those hearings and all the evidence provided to me seriously. One of our difficulties—the hon. Gentleman may have been drawn into this by the briefings that he seems to take exclusively from one 
 side of the argument—is the message from the Countryside Alliance, which has said two contradictory things. One is that if it is cruel, we should not be doing it, implying discrimination in order to remove cruelty associated with hunting with dogs. The other is that an attack on one is an attack on all, as if the Bill were about an attack rather than about preventing cruelty. Prevention of cruelty is the serious intention of the Bill and the reason why scrutiny by members of the Committee has been so important. 
 Paragraph 9.24, printed in bold type, sets out the conclusions of Lord Burns and makes it clear that there is a problem with the stopping-up of badger setts. As the hon. Gentleman indicated when he read out extracts from paragraphs 9.21 to 9.24, the report explores the options for dealing with badger setts in different circumstances. 
 Section 8(4) to (9) of the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 allows badger setts to be stopped up for certain purposes of foxhunting, providing certain conditions are met. The hon. Gentleman discussed the intentions of Ministers at the time of the passage of the 1992 Act, but I cannot comment on that. Section 3(d) of the 1992 Act makes an offence of 
''causing a dog to enter a badger sett''.
 The wording of the section explicitly states that an offence is committed by being reckless as to whether one's actions would lead to a dog entering a badger sett. 
 The Bill would remove the present exemption to the section 3(d) offence for hunting hounds that mark at a badger sett. When the Bill becomes law, it will be necessary for hunters to keep their hounds under sufficiently close control to prevent their entering badger setts. Hunters will need to take reasonable steps to prevent that. If they do not keep their dogs under control and the dogs enter a badger sett, the hunters will be acting recklessly and will be guilty of a section 3(d) offence. 
 As the Bill makes hunting illegal unless it is registered or exempted, a consequential amendment is needed in respect of the 1992 Act. The key question that must be considered is whether the blocking-up of badger setts is necessary for achieving the objective for which registration has been granted to the extent that there should be a general exception to the law that forbids such activity. Essentially, it is a matter of judgment and balance as to whether registered hunting should override what is banned in other legislation. 
 My conclusion is that the balance lies in registered hunting not being exempt. I recognise that registration to hunt with dogs can only be for pest control purposes and that without being able to block up badger setts, more pests will go to ground and have to be left. However, that outcome must be balanced against the fact that earth-stopping has long been a controversial practice. In fact, the Burns inquiry received several representations about hunts and others contravening the law on the stopping-up of badger setts. The hon. Gentleman referred to the yellow card, which sets out the expectations of the Masters of Foxhounds Association. However, it is 
 clear that Lord Burns and his colleagues took the representations on the issue very seriously indeed. 
 I conclude that the mischief must be addressed. The occasion when a pest cannot be dealt with immediately is preferable to a blanket exception from the relevant badger legislation for all registered hunting, and I therefore resist the amendment.

James Gray: I hope that I am not paraphrasing the Minister's words too much when I say that he believes that preventing the controversial practice, as he put it, of stopping up badger setts is more important than the benefit that might be gained by doing so for the purpose of pest control. He balanced the fact that stopping-up would lead to more foxes being killed not with whether there were disadvantages for badgers but with whether it was a controversial issue. He seemed to be saying that it is more important to prevent the stopping-up of badger setts because many people believe that is a bad thing than to allow it for the possible benefit of pest control.
 That is a remarkable thing to say. If the purpose behind the Bill is animal welfare and if the purpose behind registration is to allow properly qualified people to carry out the task of pest control and the killing of foxes, surely what should be in the Minister's mind is not whether a matter is controversial, but whether it will allow the better achievement of what the Bill intends, namely the killing of foxes. He is, as the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West did previously, relying on extreme and extraordinary circumstances such as badger baiting. He is confusing such illegal and disgraceful activities with the perfectly sensible, workmanlike and utilitarian conduct of those whom his registrar will allow to continue to hunt with dogs. That is a bizarre approach. If there is any purpose behind the Bill, which we are coming rapidly to doubt, it must be for gamekeepers, hunts and others to achieve registration. 
 That will not be easy. They will seek registration and the registrar will say, ''Fine, you are now allowed under the law, for the purposes of pest control, to use dogs to kill foxes and other vermin.'' That is the purpose of the Bill and one has to assume that those people will legitimately go about their business and will do what they have to do. Pest control companies, including those who undertake pest control for farmers, have been in touch with me to say that their task will be much harder. They are astonished—they do not hunt, they control pests, but they will not be able to continue their activities and will go out of business. If there is any purpose behind the Bill, and if such people are to be allowed to continue their activities, surely it is only reasonable for the Government to allow them to continue to take normal and sensible precautions, such as the closing-up of badger setts. 
 Imagine that the pest control operative in an area is called in to deal with a rogue fox, or a number of them—my view is that all foxes are rogues. The local council might deal with foxes in that area, using dogs. He sees that the entire farm is covered with badger setts and says he cannot deal with the fox because it 
 will go into one of them. At present, he can stop up the badger setts the night before under carefully controlled conditions. He then hunts the fox and kills it and reopens the badger sett. The procedure is plainly laid down by the Masters of Fox Hounds Association and others. 
 If the consequential amendment is accepted, that will not be the case. The operative will turn up at the farm and say, ''I am sorry that you are losing all your lambs, but I can do nothing about it, because you have 10 badger setts on your farm. Any fox that I chase will go straight into one and I am not allowed, under the law, to block it off to prevent that from happening.'' That blows a hole in the pest control aspect of the Bill. It will not be possible for pest control people to operate in an area—such as large parts of the west country—where there are extensive badger setts. If the stopping-up of badger setts becomes illegal, which it will under the Bill, people will not be able to use dogs for pest control. 
 The Minister is saying that the practice of stopping-up is so controversial and so obnoxious to him, his supporters, the League Against Cruel Sports and other organisations, that he will ban it even if in doing so he prevents the very people whom he seeks to register—pest controllers—from doing their jobs.

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman suggests that I take the approach that I do simply because something is controversial. In view of his earlier suggestion, which I described as absurd, to ignore the Burns report, I must point out that Lord Burns clearly looked at the evidence, saw a problem and felt that there was a need for action. I came to my conclusion in that light, not for some cavalier reason, as the hon. Gentleman suggests.

James Gray: Lord Burns came to no such clear conclusion. I quoted extensively a few moments ago from his report and his speech. He did not conclude that outlawing the stopping-up of badger setts was a good thing. He said that there was evidence of some extremists doing it wrongly, but went on to say that organised hunts do not do so. I challenge the Minister to point to any text in the Burns report or in his speech in which he says, ''I would like them to ban the stopping-up of badger setts.'' He does not say so and there is no evidence at all.
 Constantly saying, ''I am quoting Lord Burns'' has no point. Lord Burns does not recommend banning the stopping-up of badger setts; he says that some aspects of the practice should be looked into. I readily accept that. I understand that to this day there are illegal badger baiters in some parts of England. I accept that there are problems with badgers and badger setts and that must be sorted out. I question whether the Bill has any purpose and whether pest control is to be allowed using dogs, as preventing the stopping-up of badger setts would make that task impossible.

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman appeared to paraphrase Lord Burns by suggesting that there was no problem with organised hunts stopping-up badger setts. Lord Burns says no such thing. The sentence that
 the hon. Gentleman quoted from paragraph 9.22 of the report states:
''Whilst we accept that there is a lack of firm evidence linking malpractice to the hunts, we do not think we can disregard entirely the written and oral evidence we received from badger protection groups and their supporters on this issue.''
 Paragraph 9.37 of the report states: 
''We have indicated that, in the absence of a ban, consideration could be given to amending the Protection of Badgers Act 1992.''

James Gray: Is the Minister a fundamentalist Methodist or is he related to people who are? They are given to quoting at length from the Bible, saying, ''St. John chapter something or other proves my point beyond doubt.'' Someone else will say, ''Yes, but St. Luke chapter something or other proves that that is not the case.'' Precisely the same textual analysis could be applied to the Burns report and the Minister does that constantly. He quotes one little sentence as if it were conclusive. I will do the same. Paragraph 9.22 of the report says:
''Whilst we accept that there is a lack of firm evidence linking malpractice to the hunts . . . ''—
 perhaps we are to understand from that that it should be looked into. However, paragraph 9.23 states: 
''We recognise that, if hunts were not permitted to stop up badger setts, foxes would be more likely to go to ground there and would have to be left.
 Paragraph 9.24 states: 
''One option . . . would be to remove the present exemption for hunts.''
 Lord Burns said in the House of Lords debate on the Hunting Bill on 12 March 2001: 
''it is difficult to impose rules that should apply in all circumstances and in all regions. There are clearly some cases that one would wish to deal with differently from others. A licensing authority could have an important role in judging the circumstances''.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12 March 2001; Vol. 623, c. 535.]
 Quoting and counter-quoting from Lord Burns report or from his speech serves no useful function.

Rob Marris: Not when it does not back up your argument.

James Gray: That is not the point. Burns examined the facts. We are discussing not so much the facts, but their consequences. If it were made illegal for registered pest controllers who have been recognised under the Bill to stop up badger setts it would become impossible for them to do their job. If there is no exemption for organised pest controllers—and let us call them pest controllers—there would be no point in having them.
 In the west country, where I live, there would be no way that the recognised pest controllers would be able to do their jobs. Banning what the Minister describes as a controversial practice, although Lord Burns does not recommend banning it, would make it impossible for registered recognised pest controllers to do their job. It is another way in which the logic of the Bill has been utterly blown apart. Hardly any organisation will be able to register to carry out pest control with dogs if the Bill is passed. It is a nonsensical charade. It would 
 be much easier simply to ban hunting, which I know many Labour Members want to do. 
 If we accept that the purpose of the Bill is to set up a system under which certain people will be allowed to hunt foxes using dogs for the purposes of pest control, preventing them from stopping up badger setts the night before makes a nonsense of it, and we shall certainly try to persuade the Committee of that in a vote. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 20.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Schedule 3 agreed to. 
 Schedule 4 agreed to. 
 Clauses 48 and 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50 - Commencement

Colin Pickthall: I beg to move amendment No. 356, in
clause 50, page 19, line 23, leave out 'section 6' and insert 'sections 6 and 7'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 358, in 
clause 50, page 19, line 24, leave out 'and' and insert 'to'.
 Amendment No. 357, in 
clause 50, page 19, line 24, after 'under', insert 'section 7 or'.

Colin Pickthall: These are probing amendments, although I confess I did not intend them in that way when I tabled them. They have flaws and they have to an extent been overtaken by events in Committee, but the substance of what I want to say should be considered. I am sure that the Minister will consider it.
 Amendment No. 356 is intended to examine why section 6, but not section 7, should come into force one month after the Act is passed. Both cover activities that part 1 of the Bill would ban and there seems to be no more need to delay section 7 than section 6. Logically, clause 50(1)(b) should include both. Since I tabled the amendment, new clause 10 on hare coursing and new clause 11 on the use of dogs below ground have been added to part 1, so if my remarks about 
 section 7 are valid, the Minister might want to think about tidying up those provisions too. 
 Almost in parenthesis, I would add that there is more reason to include section 7, with the provisions affected by the one-month limit, if we take into account the report published by Queen's university, Belfast, about hare coursing in Northern Ireland. Hare coursers have traditionally used one argument, which has been used in this Committee, which is that their activities encourage larger hare populations. The university report contradicts that. Studying the hare population in Northern Ireland on behalf of the environment and heritage service of the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland, the university found that the number of hares is extremely low. 
 The independent report, which has only just been published, recommends that the hare should be completely removed from the quarry list in Northern Ireland and should no longer be hunted. That study is relevant because if it is shown that the hare population is damaged by coursing, the commencement date of the coursing ban should be as soon as possible after the enactment of the Bill. 
 Amendment No. 358 is a probing amendment. The one-month time limit applies only to clauses 39 and 44. Is there a reason why only those two clauses from part 3, which is about enforcement, should apply and not all the clauses between? 
 Amendment No. 357 would change subsection (1)(c), which refers to clauses 39 and 44 insofar as they relate to an offence under part 2, so that it would repeat the provisions of paragraph (a) for part 3. I suggest that clause 7 should also be included within the ambit of that subsection. I do not know why I did not include clause 6, and new clauses 10 and 11 are also relevant. 
 I freely accept that amendment No. 357 is defective, but I would still press on my right hon. Friend the principle behind the three amendments. I hope that he can assure me either that I have misinterpreted the Bill, which is possible, or that there is a means of tidying it up and making the one-month limit consistent across all relevant clauses and new clauses in part 1.

Edward Garnier: The hon. Member for West Lancashire (Mr. Pickthall) said that his amendments are probing amendments, so I need not spend too long trying to persuade the Committee that they are not worthy of support. I hope that, in due course, he will do as he implied and seek leave to withdraw them.
 Amendment No. 357 is consequential upon amendments Nos. 356 and 358, so I shall not spend time on that. However, I shall highlight one or two of the problems that the hon. Gentleman faces by deploying an argument in support of a probing amendment. Until clause 1 takes effect, clause 6 and new clause 10 will have no legal effect. They depend upon clause 1 coming into force. Amendments Nos. 356 and 358 are not helpful to our deliberations; nor do they assist in a better drafting of the Bill. 
 I can understand that the hon. Gentleman wants to bring clauses 6 and 7 into effect one month after the 
 Act is passed, which would ban competitive coursing. However, it is unclear where the ban on hare hunting described in new clause 10 will be incorporated into the Bill, and whether it will come under an amended clause 7. He has got ahead of himself. We need to see the Bill in its final Committee stage draft before we worry about the commencement provisions, which should properly be dealt with either on Report or when the Bill has been to the other place and come back to the Commons. 
 The most sensible time to consider commencement timings is when the Bill is sent to receive Royal Assent. There is an illogicality in bringing matters to an earlier commencement when they depend upon something that does not take effect for three months. That is one of the main problems that the hon. Member for West Lancashire faces in relation to amendments Nos. 356 and 358. 
 I do not need to elaborate the general principle of my concern that the amendment—I do not mean to be impolite—is useless. As the clause is drafted, there is no need for clauses 40, 41, 42 and 43 to come into force before three months. Only clauses 39 and 44 relate to part 2 provisions and are not exclusively related to the enforcement of the overarching offence of hunting. The hon. Gentleman was candid enough to say that he had changed his mind and that had he argued the case two or three weeks ago, he might have been more enthusiastic about his arguments. It was wonderful to listen to him, but perhaps that is all that we need to hear from him.

Alun Michael: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for West Lancashire for the way in which he moved his amendment, and for his suggestion that he was open to persuasion about timing. The practical effect of amendment No. 356, as he indicated, is to make the ban on hare coursing events in clause 7 effective one month after the Bill comes into force. I am sympathetic to the underlying objective of the amendment, which is to see an end to hare coursing events at the earliest opportunity. When one supports a piece of legislation and believes it to be right, one wants to see it bite as quickly and effectively as possible. I will not respond, if he will forgive me, to the substantive points that he made and to question of the Northern Ireland evidence. Although they are important matters that need to be considered, this debate concerns only the date on which the provisions come into force. The point is to put the provisions in place with a degree of consistency and in good order.
 The different sections of the Bill come into force at different times for good reasons. Part 2, which concerns registration, and the other sections of the Bill that relate to it, such as clause 6 in part 1, come into force one month after Royal Assent. That is in order to allow for applications for registration to be made so as to benefit from the transitional arrangements set out in clause 51. They can be made within the three-month time limit. The other substantive provisions in the Bill, including those creating criminal offences, come into effect three months after the granting of Royal Assent. That gives those affected by the legislation a fair time to take whatever steps are necessary to comply with the 
 new law. It would be invidious to single out one offence to be effective from a different date, although I understand the temptation from the point of view of my hon. Friend. I urge him not to press the amendment. 
 Amendment No. 358 would bring into force one month after the enactment of the Bill clauses 40, 41, 42 and 43. Those clauses relate to police powers of arrest, search and seizure and the powers of the court in regard to forfeiture and disqualification for registration. The powers are only needed by the police when the relevant substantial provisions concerning the criminal offences created by the Bill in part 1 come into effect. That will be three months after enactment. The change proposed by the amendment would provide no practical benefit because the powers could not be used until three months after the event. Amendment No. 357 follows the same line of argument and is consequential on amendment No. 356. I entirely understand my hon. Friend's wish to see the Bill's provisions biting as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, for the orderly introduction of registration and other provisions, I urge him to accept the suggested time scales.

Colin Pickthall: I am happy with that explanation of amendment No. 358, which makes sense. I still have one important question relating primarily to amendment No. 356. I still do not understand why section 6 is specifically included, whereas section 7 is not. I understood my right hon. Friend the Minister to say that it would be odd to single out one measure—I presume that he was referring to hare coursing—but clause 50 does exactly that because it singles out deer. I am happy for the Bill to do that, but I do not understand the difference between the two.

Alun Michael: The point is that part 2 deals with the commencement of registration and related provisions, such as those in clause 6, which prohibit the registration of deer hunting, and those in new clause 10, which prohibit the registration of hare hunting. Those clauses will come into force at the same time as part 2. That is logical because one cannot apply for registration for those activities when registration opens one month after Royal Assent. All the offences in the Bill will come into force at the same time—three months after the Bill is passed—so coursing will be banned at the same time as deer hunting and hare hunting, when the prohibition of other hunting that is neither registered nor exempt will also come into force.
 I understand why my hon. Friend thought that there was an inconsistency. We must distinguish between one month after Royal Assent, when everything relating to registering or not being able to register will be dealt with, and three months after, when all the offences will come into force. I assure my hon. Friend that those provisions are consistent and I apologise if I did not make that clear in my first response.

Colin Pickthall: It is probably my fault because it has taken some time for that to trickle through to my brain. I understand my right hon. Friend's explanation
 and bearing that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51 - Transitional arrangements

Gregory Barker: I beg to move amendment No. 45, in
clause 51, page 19, line 33, leave out 'three' and insert 'twelve'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 355, in
clause 51, page 19, line 39, at end insert 
 ', or on the expiry of a period of 12 months starting on the date the application was received by the registrar, whichever is the sooner.'.

Gregory Barker: I rise to speak to amendment No. 45 and to speak strongly against amendment No. 355, tabled by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West.
 Clause 51 would extend the period for making initial applications from three to 12 months. As the clause is drafted, individuals or groups who apply within the three months before part 1 comes into force may continue their activities until their applications are determined. By extending that three months to 12 months, we shall increase the time available to people to prepare their applications properly, thus increasing their chance of registering and safeguarding their right to continue hunting until their applications have been properly and fairly determined, either favourably or unfavourably. 
 As the clause is drafted, no criminal offence of hunting will come into effect until three months after the Act is passed, but part 2, which establishes the registrar and tribunal, will come into effect after one month. By the time the offences come into effect, the process of applying for registration should have begun. However, that may not be the case, depending on the speed with which the registrar and tribunal are established and Parliament agrees the necessary secondary legislation. As it stands, hunts and individuals who apply for registration in those three months are allowed to continue as if the application had been granted until the application is approved or denied. The amendment is simply a question of natural justice, and I hope that it is non-controversial. 
 As with any evidence-based legal judgment, the quality of the evidence will be crucial. Under the Bill, anyone who seeks registration must show that he wants to hunt for one of the reasons set out in clause 8 and that the activity constitutes pest control and will contribute significantly to preventing the serious damage that the wild mammals in question would cause. 
 The applicant must also satisfy the least-suffering test. As the Bill was drafted, the applicant had to show that the utility of hunting 
''could not reasonably be expected to be made . . . in a manner likely to cause . . . less pain, suffering or distress to the wild mammals to be hunted.''
 That standard of proof was toughened to an extraordinary degree in the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, which had the Minister's support. Under the Bill as amended, the applicant must now show that hunting would cause significantly less suffering than any other method. Under the original least-suffering test, the applicant had to prove his case on the balance of probabilities, but the test has now been amended and he must prove it beyond reasonable doubt. That is the highest standard in criminal law and it applies to offences such as rape and murder. 
 There are two hurdles facing individuals and organisations that seek registration.

Rob Marris: The hon. Gentleman outlines the changes, but would he care to remind the Committee that there was no Division on the amendment that I tabled to clause 8(2)? Opposition Members, including the hon. Gentleman, did not oppose that amendment to the cruelty test.

Gregory Barker: I will have to look back at the record, but I take the hon. Gentleman's point. If that was the case, it should not be taken as any sort of approval on the part of Opposition Members, given the overwhelming numbers of Labour Members.
 As I said, there are two hurdles facing those who seek registration. The first is to prove that something will happen rather than might happen. That is unknowable. The onus is therefore on the applicant to foresee not only what damage certain wild animals will cause but the seriousness of that unknowable future damage. 
 The second hurdle is to prove that hunting would cause significantly less suffering than any alternative. That automatically assumes that hunting is cruel and, ipso facto, the worst method. The Bill therefore requires the applicant to prove that other methods are not only worse but significantly so. How can someone do that when the research has not been done? Throughout this long Committee, hon. Members on both sides have selectively quoted the Burns report, which lends itself to that. Although Burns expresses several views there is a consistent caveat before many of his key recommendations. It is: 
''There is a lack of firm scientific evidence about the effect on the welfare of a fox of being closely pursued, caught and killed above ground by hounds.''
 The words 
''lack of firm scientific evidence''
 appear in points 56 and 57 of the summary, and they recur consistently throughout the report. In chapter 9, the report makes a clear recommendation of further research. He states: 
''We have noted, in earlier chapters, a number of issues on which there appears to be a lack of firm information. A good many of these would probably lend themselves to further work, and could be considered as possible research studies, if a ban on hunting was not introduced. A number of them would be of considerable relevance even if there was not a ban.''
 A list is cited in relation to foxes, deer and hares. The comparative welfare implications of different methods of killing foxes in particular are singled out as an area that requires further research. 
 Before the tribunal, we will be looking not for views but for firm evidence. That is surely the only thing that will be acceptable. It is indisputable that according to Burns that firm evidence is not there. All the way through the Committee, the Minister has consistently failed to bring forward any categorical, clinical, veterinary or scientific evidence to support his assertions. 
 How can applicants going before the tribunal disprove an assumption of hunting being cruel when it has never been proven? One cannot disprove something that has never been proven and one certainly cannot do it in the matter of weeks set out by the new licensing regime. The purpose of setting out in some detail the standard of proof and evidence required of an applicant under clause 8 is to show that, to have any chance of being registered, any individual or group will need sufficient time to prepare and research that application while being allowed to continue their lawful activities until the application is finally determined. 
 It must not be forgotten that the law-abiding citizens who are making applications will be up against the wealth of resources of potentially hostile prescribed animal welfare organisations that are benefiting from Government grants. The whole process is weighted against the applicant and predicated on the falsehood that hunting has been proven on the basis of fact and science to be cruel. That is clearly not the case. 
 The Minister was ready to accept an increase in the time period that must elapse between the failure of one application and a new application from six to 12 months, despite the terrible effect that that will have on gamekeepers, farmers and land managers. I ask the Minister if, as a way of retrieving a little of his tattered reputation in the matter, he will accept the amendment as a gesture that shows—I am addressing my points through the Chair directly to the Minister and I would be grateful if he would listen to my point—

Alun Michael: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. It is a little childish for Opposition Members to feel that they have to seek attention in this way. We could all hop up and down and point out when Opposition Members are not paying attention to comments, whether they are made by Ministers or others. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I shall take his remarks seriously when I respond to them.

Gregory Barker: I am sorry that the Minister felt the need to hop up like that. I am coming to my final remarks on the amendment and was addressing those remarks specifically to him. He is obviously not listening again. [Interruption.] Would the Minister stop rambling on and allow me to finish?

Alun Michael: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Gregory Barker: No.

Alun Michael: On a point of order, Mrs. Roe, is the hon. Gentleman allowed simply to be rude about
 Government Members instead of dealing with the issues, addressing them through you?

George Stevenson: Let us get on with the debate.

Gregory Barker: I was asking the Minister if he will make a final gesture that will demonstrate to the people in the countryside, however stacked against them the Bill is, that he will at least give them a fair and proper chance of passing an impassable test.
 I firmly oppose amendment No. 355, which would mean that a person who put in an application within three months of the passing of the Bill would be allowed to continue hunting only until the application was determined or after 12 months from the date on which the registrar received the application. The amendment is breathtaking and extraordinary. It shows clearly that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West has no faith in the system that the Minister proposes or the Minister's ability to run and direct the system. 
 The amendment is also an extraordinary departure. Imagine if the same principle was applied to asylum seekers. They come to this country and make an application. The onus is on them to prove that they have a fair and valid reason to seek asylum. We know that the asylum system is riddled with delays. It has been inundated with applications and has not coped. Imagine if each asylum seeker was told after 12 months, ''Sorry, your time is up. We haven't been able to deal with your application. Go back to whence you came.'' That would be extraordinary, but the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West proposes that the same principle of justice should be imposed on people in the countryside who carry out activities that have been legal and that they believe remain fair and normal. They would be penalised in a totally unacceptable way and imposing such justice on any other member of the community would be unacceptable. 
 The Bill accepts that hunting is a legal activity that has been carried out through the mists of time. It will ban certain forms of hunting but sets tests that other forms must pass to remain lawful. The fact that the Bill is a ban in all but form is irrelevant to the amendment. The Bill accepts that a currently legal activity may still be legal after it has been subjected to two tests and as such, if individuals or groups apply for registration in an allotted time, they should be presumed innocent until their case for registration has been determined. People should not be criminalised at a stroke only to be decriminalised if their application for registration is successful.

Hugo Swire: Does my hon. Friend agree that a cynic might be forgiven for thinking that the impetus for the registrar to deal with an application would not be great if it would elapse after 12 months anyway?

Gregory Barker: Absolutely. The hearings in Portcullis house were totally manipulated and they have been exposed in this Committee as a total and utter sham and a massive deceit. On the basis of what we have seen from the Government so far, no one can
 have any faith that the tribunal system will be fair if there is a cut-off after 12 months.

Lembit Öpik: With regard to the effectiveness of the three-day hearings, does the hon. Gentleman accept that having participated in them, I believe that the outcomes were entirely healthy, impressive and useful for debate? The tragedy is that many of the facts have been ignored by those who did not bother reading the reports or who retained their prejudices after reading them.

Gregory Barker: I wholeheartedly agree. I was not denigrating those who participated in the proceedings in Portcullis house or in the Burns report. I was simply pointing out that the Government organised the proceedings as a ruse—the purpose was a sham.
 The Government have tried to limit trial by jury and want to abolish the right to silence in certain cases. However, surely even this illiberal Government, which has moved against so many civil rights that have been cherished for centuries, would not question the basic principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty. The Bill starts from an assumption of guilt. It is structured on the basis that hunting is proven to be cruel, although we know that it is not. The Bill reverses the burden of proof. The applicant is deemed guilty and must prove that he is not to be allowed to continue hunting.

Hugo Swire: Does my hon. Friend know of any other legislation under which an applicant would lose the right to be granted a licence after a statutory period of 12 months if, for whatever reason, his application had not been processed? Also, the law is so weighted against the applicant that a preferred organisation, yet to be determined in legislation, is effectively to be bankrolled by the state to lodge an objection should that applicant ever have been granted his registration in the first place.

Gregory Barker: The answer to my hon. Friend's question is absolutely not. He makes an extremely clear and powerful point. This is the most horrendous amendment. I have no idea whether all the money that is to go to the prescribed animal welfare groups would have to be returned if the licence were denied after 12 months because the application had not been heard. So many questions remain unanswered in relation to this nasty little amendment that I hope it will not be pressed to a division.
 While applications are sub judice, the correct presumption, which the Bill reflects, is that what has always been lawful should remain lawful unless it fails the new statutory tests for lawfulness. The hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West fears that the bureaucratic system that the Bill establishes and that the Minister will erect will be inadequately managed, supervised and directed by the Minister, and will not be able to cope with the thousands of applications and appeals that will result. 
 Clearly, the hon. Gentleman has little faith in his colleagues or the system. He seems to be saying that it would be better to judge everybody guilty at some arbitrary date and then some years later say to them, 
 ''Sorry, we were absolutely wrong. What you were doing was legal all along. Our mistake.'' That is playing with people's lives and may cost them their livelihoods, turn families out of their homes, and have a profound impact on the ecology and wildlife of the English countryside. There will be hugely damaging consequences across whole communities, all because the Government could not act quickly enough to deal with a bureaucratic, intolerant, illiberal licensing regime that they have imposed arbitrarily. That is grossly unfair and flies in the face of natural justice. 
 I profoundly disagree with many of the arguments that the hon. Gentleman forward during this long Committee stage, but I give him credit for the intellectual rigour that he always tried to bring to his arguments. He has always been attentive to the Opposition, although we often do not agree with him. He has tried in certain cases to understand the arguments about which we feel so strongly. I appeal without rancour to his better nature and ask him to consider the reality of what the amendment would impose and the precedent that it would set. I appeal to him not to press the amendment to a Division.

Rob Marris: Given the comprehensive remarks of the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Gregory Barker), who opposed my amendment, hon. Members will be fairly clear about the import of the amendment. It would, as he suggested, introduce a long stop to cap the transitional period and I stress that. It is not that I have no faith in my right hon. Friend the Minister, but I am concerned about huge numbers of applications clogging up the system. Group registrations involve 50 people. I cannot do the maths, but some hon. Members may be able to—if they perm any 49 from those 50, some 2,500 applications could be made. That could represent a concerted campaign by those who wish to carry on with their activities.
 We should also bear in mind something that, with the greatest respect, the hon. Gentleman overlooked in his remarks. We are dealing with a transitional period. If an applicant or group of applicants fell foul of the transitional 12-month long stop that I want to insert in the Bill, but it was subsequently determined that their application was in order and they passed the sequential test in clause 8, they could resume their activity.

Gregory Barker: Does the hon. Gentleman not understand that there is a cost to keeping hounds, to keeping horses stabled and to maintaining the fabric of the hunting community? It would be no good for a hunting community or a hunt to be told 24 months or 3 years after their activities had been stopped by the force of criminal law, ''You can carry on now'', when people have lost their jobs or been turned out of their homes and the hounds have been lost or put to sleep. It is facile to suggest such a thing.

Rob Marris: That is an interesting intervention because it implies that there will be a campaign to clog up the system. If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting—[Interruption.] I will finish my point and then I will give way to the hon. Gentleman. He is suggesting that applications could take up to three years to determine, which suggests a concerted campaign to clog up the system.

Gregory Barker: I am not suggesting that there will be a concerted campaign. I am simply saying that the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment because he clearly has no faith in the Minister's ability to deliver a verdict within 12 months. If activities are stopped, irrevocable harm and damage will be done to any ability to resume hunting later.

Rob Marris: One must bear in mind that this example is not unique. In the licensing of on and off-sales in public houses, someone who is outwith the rules for a short period still has to pay the overhead on the public house.

Lembit Öpik: Regardless of how many applications are received, it goes against natural justice arbitrarily to prevent well-meaning individuals who are acting in good faith in the spirit of the legislation from continuing their activity after 12 months, simply because the system cannot cope. The hon. Gentleman is trying to close what he regards to be a loophole created by the inadequacies of the legislation. The punishment—which is effectively what it would be—is inappropriate. The correct response is to ensure that the legislation works. I understand what he is trying to do, but he is hitting the wrong target.

Rob Marris: I am not trying to close a loophole. As I have said, I am trying to exert pressure to ensure that we have a proper registrar and tribunal system that deals with such matters promptly. [Interruption.] Hon. Members should allow me to develop my argument. We have an adequate system of registrars and tribunals that deals with the applications timeously. It is in the interests of the applicants as well as society to decide whether to regulate an activity.

Hugo Swire: The hon. Gentleman alluded to the licensing of public houses and how a publican has to continue paying rates while his application is processed. That is a wrong allusion because it ignores animal welfare. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle said earlier, if a hunt has been refused a licence—
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.